
Elon Musk, através de sua conta no X, acaba de publicar 6 posts relatando as declarações feitas pela rede na investigação da Seção 301 sobre o Brasil. Na íntegra, os posts estão publicados abaixo - originais e respectivas traduções. Posteriormente, também está traduzido o documento (comentários) encaminhado à USTR, seguido de seu original.
A revelação feita pela X Corp (Twitter) ao governo americano expõe uma desordem internacional: o Brasil, sob ordens de Alexandre de Moraes e conivência do governo Lula, violou o Marco Civil da Internet, quebrou tratados internacionais e impôs censura e punições ilegais a empresas americanas, como Twitter e até SpaceX. Isso está no centro do processo que levou os EUA a abrir investigação contra o Brasil com base na Seção 301.
Boa leitura.
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August 17, 2025
X Corp.
865 FM 1209 Building 2
Bastrop, TX 78602
August 17, 2025
X Corp.
865 FM 1209 Building 2
Bastrop, TX 78602
Ambassador Jamieson Greer
United States Trade Representative
600 17th Street NW
Washington, DC 20508
Re: Concerns Regarding Recent Developments in Brazilian Internet Regulation
Framework and its impacts to U.S.-based platforms
Dear Ambassador Greer,
X (formerly Twitter) established its first office in Brazil in 2012 and has
maintained operations in the country for over a decade. Brazil represents one
of the platform's largest global user bases, making it a strategically significant
market for X. X has closely observed the evolution of local policy, court
interpretations, and enforcement practices. Over this period, certain
developments have raised substantial concerns regarding regulatory
predictability, proportionality of enforcement, and the protection of
cross-border digital trade and expression. These trends directly impact U.S.
digital service providers and warrant close examination in the context of the
Section 301 process.
In 2014, Brazil enacted the Marco Civil da Internet (the Civil Rights Framework
for the Internet), establishing a foundational legal framework for internet
governance in the country. The law recognizes the global scale of the internet
(Art. 2, I), its role in facilitating access to information and knowledge (Art. 4, II).
It guarantees freedom of expression (Art. 3, I), and the protection of privacy
(Art. 3, II), while also affirming the principle of freedom in business models. The
Marco Civil further provides that its principles operate in conjunction with
Brazil's international treaty commitments, reinforcing the alignment between
domestic regulation and global norms.
Significantly, its Article 19 established intermediary liability rules designed to
safeguard fundamental rights, including freedom of expression and
information. Under this framework, internet applications, including social media
platforms, can facilitate open and decentralized communication, allowing
individuals to share opinions, commentary, and creative content beyond
traditional media channels. The Marco Civil provides that internet applications
can only be held liable for user-generated content if that content is deemed
illegal by an independent court, the internet application receives proper notice
of a court order indicating the location of the unlawful content, and the
provider fails to comply with that valid court order.
However, subsequent court rulings and government policy directions have
undermined key protections established by the Marco Civil da Internet.Brazilian courts have, over the years, held that judges may directly compel
local subsidiaries of foreign internet application companies to produce any
digital evidence necessary to investigate torts and crimes under Brazilian
jurisdiction, bypassing established diplomatic channels such as the Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) process. This approach has been applied
regardless of where the data is processed and stored, irrespective of technical
nexus with Brazil or potential conflicts with the laws of other jurisdictions,
including the U.S. In practice, courts have ordered direct disclosure of data
and content located outside Brazil, from data subjects that are foreign users,
including U.S. users, without engaging U.S. authorities. Companies attempting
to challenge such orders have faced multi-million dollar fines, threats of arrests
of local executives (who lack technical access to the requested data) and even
blocking of the service in Brazil.
In February 2023, Brazil’s Supreme Court (STF) upheld the Ação Declaratória
de Constitucionalidade n. 51 that even the content of communications may be
compelled from internet applications without using established diplomatic
mechanisms such as the MLAT process. The decision relied on an expansive
and incorrect reading of Article 11 of the Marco Civil, effectively bypassing
long-standing procedures designed to respect foreign jurisdictional interests
under international law. Brazil remains the only country in the region that
systematically rejects the application of mutual legal assistance agreements,
instead compelling local subsidiaries to comply with orders, including those
that conflict with both Brazilian law and the laws of other countries, including
the U.S. Moreover, Brazilian authorities require such local subsidiaries to
operate in the country on pain of their internet application services being shut
down, ensuring that Brazilian authorities may maintain coercive leverage over
foreign internet application providers.
In June 2025, the STF also ruled Article 19 of the Marco Civil da Internet is
partially unconstitutional, significantly altering the intermediary liability
framework. Under the original rule, internet applications could only be held
liable for user-generated content if they failed to comply with a valid court
order identifying the specific illegal material. The Court's decision removes this
safeguard, allowing liability to arise based solely on private notices or claims of
offense, with no prior judicial review. This new standard increases legal
uncertainty, elevates compliance costs, incentivizes litigation against
U.S.-based internet application companies, and creates strong incentives for
platforms to remove content preemptively, potentially affecting lawful speech,
including that of U.S. persons. By expanding the scope of liability without
legislative action, the ruling also undermines regulatory predictability for
U.S.-based internet application providers, creating operational legal risks that
may restrict market access and digital trade between the United States and
Brazil.
This new liability standard now applies even to complex disputes over legality
that courts themselves take years to resolve and on which court panels often
disagree, effectively transferring legal determinations to private companies. In
practice, this could result in the removal of content originating from U.S.-based
individuals or entities, impacting cross-border information flows. Platforms that
decline to make such determinations risk substantial financial penalties,
creating strong incentives to over-comply. The combination of legal
uncertainty, elevated compliance costs, and extraterritorial reach constitutes a
trade-restrictive environment that may deter investment and innovation byU.S.
-based internet application providers in the Brazilian market.
Some Brazilian courts have also held that their takedown orders have global
effects, meaning they can require an internet application provider to remove
content deemed unlawful in Brazil from all jurisdictions where the internet
application provider operates, even if such content is lawful elsewhere,
including in the United States. For example, the Third Chamber of Brazil’s
Superior Court of Justice (STJ) recently ruled that a Brazilian court order
determining the removal of offensive content from an internet application
applies extraterritorially. The STJ, by majority vote, determined that the global
enforcement is a “natural consequence of the internet’s borderless nature”,
notwithstanding the fundamental principle of international law that a court’s
jurisdiction is limited to its own territory.
Since 2020, the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) and the Electoral Superior Court
(TSE), notably through several orders issued by Justice Alexandre de Moraes,
have ordered X to deplatform users, including politicians and journalists,
including in some cases U.S. persons. The vast majority of these orders were
issued under seal, preventing affected users from being notified or exercising
their right to defend themselves in court. Many went beyond the removal of
specific content deemed unlawful, requiring the suspension of entire accounts.
X's appeals against such measures - when not left undecided for extended
periods of time without a legal basis - were dismissed for lack of standing,
with Justice Alexandre de Moraes holding that X had no right to challenge the
orders.
When X declined to comply with measures that were clearly excessive and
lacked legal basis, Justice de Moraes blocked access to the platform
nationwide, froze the bank accounts of the local subsidiary and its legal
representative, and threatened this legal representative with imprisonment.
Justice de Moraes further ordered, without legal basis, the seizure of
approximately USD 2 million from the bank account ofSpaceX’s Starlink
division, even though Starlink and SpaceX had no connection to the legal
dispute with X and are unaffiliated corporate entities. These measures, taken
against local subsidiaries and unrelated third parties (including a different
U.S.-based company), illustrate the extent to which enforcement actions in
Brazil can escalate beyond domestic jurisdictional limits, creating legal
uncertainty, operational risk, and potential trade barriers for U.S.-based companies.
Since the enactment of the Marco Civil da Internet in 2014, Brazil established a
legal framework that, on paper, sought to balance fundamental rights,
innovation, and international cooperation.
However, subsequent policy developments and enforcement practices -
particularly through expansive judicial interpretations - have progressively
eroded these safeguards. The Brazilian judiciary has adopted measures that
contradict the original intent of the Marco Civil, as well as Brazil’s international
treaty commitments with the United States, including bypassing the Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty process, imposing extraterritorial content removal
orders, altering intermediary liability rules without legislative process, and
employing coercive measures against local subsidiaries, its representatives
and even unrelated third parties. These actions have created an environment of
legal uncertainty, operational and compliance risks, and potential market
access barriers for U.S.-based technology companies. The cumulative effecthas been a marked deterioration in the regulatory and judicial climate for digital
services in Brazil, undermining both the rule of law and the stability necessary
for cross-border trade and investment in the technology sector.
Sincerely,
X Corp.
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